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Economic Outlook: 2004 Global
recovery – 2005 the US Loses
Steam
As 2004, many forecasters including our-
selves are getting more optimistic about
the outlook for the world economy. Our
forecast for 2004 is above that of many,
around 4.5% with the US once more lead-
ing the way close to 4.5% according to
our projection. At the same time, many,
also including ourselves continue to warn
about the dangers of the US balance of
payments, the current account deficit and
now the »twin« deficit problem of the cur-
rent account and fiscal deficits.
To some extent, the strong recovery for
2004 is almost baked in the cake, and the
real question is the sustainability. We be-
lieve that beyond 2004 it is difficult to be
so optimistic unless the US current ac-
count and fiscal deficits are brought
under control. Over the past twelve
months, strong US growth has been achie-
ved by aggressive monetary policy, signi-
ficant fiscal easing and the benefits of a
weaker dollar. Over time, these stimula-
tive effects will wear off, and unless the sa-
me stimuli can be repeated US growth will
weaken once more, and the world eco-
nomy will become more vulnerable.
The key to maintaining our optimism is
that US, and other G7 policymakers, need
to ensure that global financial conditions
do not tighten much. Other policymakers
including the Chinese have an important
role to play here. In order that global fi-
nancial conditions don’t tighten, this me-
ans that US interest rates cannot rise
much from their current low levels, or cer-
tainly not until other countries have de-
veloped much stronger domestic demand
led growth.
To maintain low interest rates, the US will
need to tighten fiscal policy after the elec-
tion almost irrelevant of the winner. In such
circumstances the value of the dollar will
almost definitely need to decline further.
Other nations will have to introduce poli-
cies to offset the impact of a weaker dol-
lar rather than to try and stop its decline.
Recent trade data suggests to an optimist
that the US current account deficit could
be stabilising at around 5% of GDP, and in
this regard is a hopeful sign. It could be
the case that this is just a temporary sta-
bilisation before the strength of US demand
sucks in higher imports and leads to fresh
deterioration. Even assuming the optimis-
tic scenario, however, a current account
balance of 5% of GDP is very problematic.
Attracting such capital flows is no longer
so attractive for the US especially given the
desirability of China, India and elsewhere
to US companies. If the current account
deficit does not actually soon fall, as op-
posed to merely stabilise, then the US will
see its net external liabilities rise beyond
40% of GDP by 2006. This would create a
growing burden for the US in terms of debt
financing, and the persistence of a current
account deficit close to 5% and a rising
debt burden would eventually result in a
complete halt to foreign capital inflows.
To reduce this threat, further dollar weak-
ness is not only desirable, it is almost
unavoidable. The question really is how
much and how soon. 
Linked to this challenge is of course the
issue of Asian central bank intervention
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and the incredible growth of Asian foreign exchange reserves.
At the time of writing, Asian central bank foreign exchange
reserves are about to cross the $2.0 trillion barrier, yes 2 tril-
lion. Japan’s foreign exchange reserves now approximate
$700.0bn. South Korea has reserves of $155.0bn, Taiwan
more than $200.0bn. Even India has reserves in excess of
$100.0bn. At some stage, these nations are going to
develop sufficient self-confidence that they will reduce their
degree of intervention or possibly even stop completely. At
some time before the decade is over, some Asian countries
will probably move away from using the dollar as the basis
for their foreign exchange management policies. It could
be that by 2010, Asian countries will manage their foreign
exchange policies with an Asian benchmark or at least on
a basket basis.
If this latter move were to happen quickly, and Asian cur-
rencies float, this could in turn represent a major challenge
to the US bonds market, and in turn, to US consumers who
would suddenly find their debt servicing burden rise sharp-
ly. If such circumstances were to appear, the US demand-
led consumption for the world economy would rapidly dis-
appear.
Consequently while the 2004 economic outlook looks san-
guine, it is not without risks; and without fresh economic po-
licies, the costs of 2004 success could be borne in later
years. To avoid this nasty eventuality, the dollar must decline
further and steadily. US fiscal policy needs to be tightened,
and other nations need to find more flexible policies to off-
set dollar weakness. In Europe, the recently enforced flexi-
bility of the Stability Pact needs to be consolidated and
changed into something more sensible. It is important also
that the ECB tries once more to re-interpret its inflation targ-
et, perhaps shifting to a symmetric target around its 2%
goal as opposed to »just below«. European authorities may
have to deal with a weak dollar for a long time.